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Introduction
Champagne. Parmesan. Bordeaux. All of these words hold dual meanings: an
agricultural product and a geographical region. Besides their similar signified meanings,
they also share a regime of legislation that interacts with a unique and complex type of
intellectual property used around the world. The legal term that encompasses these food
products, as well as many others, is the Geographical Indication. This umbrella term
denotes many kinds of labeling systems, varying widely among the 196 countries that use
Geographical Indications (GIs) in some way, which link the characteristics of a product
exclusively or partially to its geographic origin. The most commonly cited contemporary
definition of GIs comes from Article 22 of the TRIPS agreement:
“Indications which identify a good as originating in the territory
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”
This definition was established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as part
of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, signed
in 1994. TRIPS is an international agreement that aimed to establish a regulatory
framework for GIs due to the multiplicity of systems of protection that existed and
continue to exist worldwide. It formally defines GIs, attempts to pull these varying
systems into alignment, and provides a framework for dispute settlement among
worldwide actors. (Giovannucci, Josling, Kerr, O’Connor & Yeung, 2009) The definition
of GIs established by TRIPS is used in this project because it is an overarching and
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widely accepted formal standard. It encompasses many of the different methods of
legislating and protecting Geographical Indications, two of which will be examined in
this document.
The ideological foundation of special legislation for food products that are linked
to their region of origin is the concept of terroir, a French term which loosely translates
to “the taste of place.” It stems from the Latin word terra, meaning Earth, and refers to a
connection between the area where a food product is made and its taste (Jacobsen, 2010).
Terroir encompasses both geospatial and sociocultural elements, described as “the
interplay of human ingenuity and curiosity with the natural givens of place.” (Barham,
2003) These elements are as diverse as climate, geology, social traditions of production,
and ever-changing aspects of culture as it interacts with place and time. Terroir only
becomes more complex through study, revealing “a cultural history involving more than
a peasant tending a patch of soil but rather many peasants in many locations, all invested
in shared social meanings and practices.” (Trubek, Guy & Bowen, 2010)
Through the use of Geographical Indications, terroir is translated to an
intellectual property regime that has both cultural and economic value for the regions that
choose to employ them. Though no comprehensive registry exists, Giovannucci et al.,
2009, cite that over 10,000 GIs worldwide are legally protected in some way, with 6,021
in use by the European Union. European intellectual property surrounding origin products
has evolved in a way that supports GIs first and foremost, particularly over other types of
marks such as trademarks. (Gangjee, 2012) In Section 1 of this paper, I will describe the
ways in which Europe has chosen to protect GIs and recount the history and management
of several of the most notable French and European labeling systems - the Appellation
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d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC), Protection Designation of Origin (PDO), and Protected
Geographical Indication (PGI).
The interplay of intellectual property, collective management and government
support through GI legislation has allowed for the enormous economic success of my
first case study, Comté cheese from the Franche-Comté of France. Comté is a raw cow’s
milk semi-hard Alpine-style cheese that is aged for anywhere from four months to two
years, and is the most consumed AOC cheese in France as well as one of the most welldocumented. (Comté USA, 2013) In Section 2, I will describe and give an outline of how
Comté is managed through France’s organization for management of GIs, L’Institut
National de l’Origine et de la Qualité (INAO). I will also provide evidence for the
economic rural development impact of AOC Comté on the region of the Franche-Comté,
a benefit that Vermont policymakers could take into account when considering an originlinked labeling system in the state.
Terroir in America, because the concept is relatively new to the agricultural
conversation, is understood in a very different way than in France or Europe. French and
European producers have had hundreds of years to discover the connections between
place and product, rendering individual producers far less important than the
characteristics of the landscape itself. In French and European terroir, the rent-producing
reputation of the product is linked more strongly to the expression of its characteristics
than to the identity of any particular producer. (Barham, 2003) American terroir,
described by Jacobson, 2010, and Trubek, 2009, is in the relative beginnings of its
exploration and exists within a political and economic framework characterized by
American individualism and entrepreneurship. This particular sociopolitical climate
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influences American understanding of terroir, which emphasizes the importance of the
individual producer and their reputation, rather than the characteristics of the product
itself as an expression of the landscape - “less a matter of patrimony than intellectual
property.” (Paxson, 2010)
GIs as intellectual property vary greatly from the trademark system that is
traditionally used in the United States to protect both agricultural products and other
commodities. Unlike trademarks, Geographical Indications cannot be bought or owned
by a single party and instead are held by the government on behalf of all the producers
that reside within the delineated region. Anyone within the region can use the marks, as
long as they follow the strict specifications of production that are laid out in the cahier
des charges, the French term for the list of regulations that each AOC-certified product
follows. Collective marks, another form of intellectual property used in the United States
as well as abroad, come closer to a GI regime as they are owned by a collective of people.
However, they still can be purchased and sold and thus are contrary to the fundamental
basis of the GI as a public good that is available for use by anyone in a region. (Josling,
2006)
In Section 3, I will illustrate some of the conflicts that arise from these conflicting
intellectual property paradigms within the U.S. and France. When two different
interpretations of terroir, approaches to agricultural policy, and dominant types of IP
combine on a trade level, it is nearly impossible to reconcile. I will describe the
differences between GIs and trademarks in much greater detail and explain how these
differences result in conflicts on the international level within free-trade agreements like
TRIPS.
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The interaction between American origin-linked production and modern dairy
policy is displayed in Section 4 with a case study involving the Cellars at Jasper Hill,
located in Greensboro, Vermont. Inspired and influenced by the AOC Comté model,
actors along the supply chain of Jasper Hill cheese are highly aware of terroir, utilising
The Taste of Place as their tagline. They are active participants in the construction of an
economy within a small-town landscape, a “reverse-engineering of terroir” as it is
characterized by Paxson, 2012. I conducted this case study via a series of in-depth
interviews all along the supply chain of one Jasper Hill cheese in particular, Alpha
Tolman, an Alpine-style cheese. Though the legislative and ideological frameworks
surrounding Jasper Hill and AOC Comté may seem completely different, in my analysis
of both case studies I will illuminate the structural similarities and values, namely an
emphasis on the local community, that provides a framework of reconciliation for these
two systems.
In undertaking this project of comparing French and American intellectual
property and agricultural policies and their effects on origin-linked labeling, with the
intention of forming recommendations for Vermont dairy policy, I make the assumption
that Vermont has reason to want to adopt origin-linked labeling. This assumption is based
on several of the main arguments made by proponents of GIs, namely that GIs hold
potential as a rural economic development tool, as an environmental preservation tool,
and as a cultural preservation tool. (Allaire, Barjolle, Marescotti, Sylvander, ThevenodMottet, & Tregear, 2006) I focus on the first argument as the framework of my analysis
of Comté and, to a lesser extent, Jasper Hill.
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Producers of terroir or origin-linked products that are legally regulated under
either AOC or PDO/PGI legislation often enjoy a larger profit on their products over their
generic competitors, referred to as economic rent, because of the assumptions of higher
quality that are associated with AOC or PDO/PGI labels. (Bramley & Kirsten, 2007)
Geographical Indications can be large employers in the areas in which they are
delineated, providing employment opportunities all along the supply chain of a given
good. The rural economic development benefits of Geographical Indications also reach as
far as increased agro-tourism in regions where the goods are produced and an assured
sense of income for those involved in the production of a GI. This has both monetary and
social value (Gerz & Dupont, 2006)
A second argument for strong GI protection refers to the potential benefits to
agrobiodiversity that can result from GI legislation. The creation of markets for originlinked products can preserve the use of certain species of plants and/or animals that have
historically been used in the production of a good and which would otherwise be phased
out in favor of more efficient or modern species. (Bérard & Marchenay, 2008) One
example of this is the Ardèche chestnut, of which many varietals were threatened by
market pressure towards “intensive cultivation,” and thus the recognition of a
denomination of origin allowed 19 varieties of local chestnuts to be protected. (Santilli,
2012)
A third argument, less well-documented, regards the protection of traditional
methods of production, some of which have a history of hundreds of years. Many of these
traditional methods would be lost to modernization and the increasing industrialization of
food production without GI legislation, because it would become too costly to use them
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and producers would not be able to remain economically viable. (Allaire, Barjolle,
Marescotti, Sylvander & Thévenod-Mottet, 2006) One example of this is Picodon, a
French cheese which uses a wash of water and vinegar to “restart” the culturing after it
has been stored a long time. This process was formalized by the cahier des charges for
the PDO designation and thus the process was preserved. (Bérard & Marchenay, 2008)
None of these benefits are ever a guarantee for a GI product, however. The
success of any AOC, PDO, PGI or other designation is dependent on the management of
the product and its supply chain, and it’s possible that the opposite of any of these
positive effects could occur. One unfortunate example lies in tequila - adoption of PDO
status for tequila in Mexico did not include certain types of agave, and they were lost to
extinction. (Santilli, 2008) Thus, adoption of a GI designation is not a cure-all.
Giovannucci et al. (2009) name several conditions that are likely to lead to success for GI
products: strong organizational and institutional structures, equitable participation, strong
market partners and effective legal protection.
With these conditions in mind, in Section 5 I offer suggestions for Vermont
agricultural policies to better protect and manage existing origin-linked products such as
the cheese made by the Cellars at Jasper Hill. As U.S. and French intellectual property
structures are so different from one another, it may be too difficult to attempt to legislate
American GIs through an IP framework. However, an existing agriculture structure may
prove amenable to origin-linked characterization: the cooperative system. Vermont dairy
farmers and cheesemakers are already involved with a number of different cooperatives,
and applying an origin-linked status to a group of common producers could help to
manage the supply chain and reproduce some of the positive economic effects displayed
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by Comté and other AOC cheeses. This section serves as a synthesis of all my analyses,
resulting in the ultimate argument of this paper: Though French and American
conceptions of GIs have developed within opposing intellectual property contexts,
Vermont agricultural policy could be amended using cooperative structures to better
exploit economic rural development potential within its origin-linked products. I aim for
this project to ultimately be useful to Vermont policymakers and scholars of origin
labeling as a rural economic development tool, and thus my recommendations will err on
the side of pragmatism.
This project is only one of many scholarly interpretations of AOC Comté,
Vermont origin products and even of the Cellars at Jasper Hill. Nonetheless, I hope to
provide a beneficial and workable addition to the existing body of scholarship in order to
continue moving towards an understanding of Geographical Indications within an
American context and their potential benefits and limitations. I aspire to contribute to the
comparison between French and U.S. origin product management in a meaningful way,
using a product everyone can get behind: cheese.
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Methods

The development of this project arose from time that I spent this summer in
Bourg-en-Bresse, France. I spent time working in the research library at a branch of
France’s Centre Nationale des Recherches Scientifiques (CNRS) titled “Ressources,
cultures, usages, sociétés. This opportunity came from my connection to Dr. Amy Trubek
and Dr. Elizabeth Barham, both scholars of origin products, who introduced me to Dr.
Laurence Bérard, the head researcher at this CNRS branch. Dr. Bérard and her husband
Philippe Marchenay welcomed me into their home in St. Paul de Varax, and allowed me
access to their wealth of resources on Geographical Indications, the INAO, and AOC
products such as Comté. Spending every day in Dr. Bérard’s research library opened my
eyes to the wealth of information and documentation available on Comté, particularly as
an example of rural economic development, and my interest was piqued.
After returning to Vermont and talking to Dr. Trubek about my interest in Comté,
she directed me to the Cellars at Jasper Hill and their terroir-driven cheese making
operation. I got in contact with Zoe Brickley, the sales manager at the Cellars, and
organized all my interviews from there. I decided to conduct interviews all along the
supply chain of Alpha Tolman (an Alpine-style cheese, the closest to Comté in style
though it is more directly based on an Appenzeller) and see how the different actors
interacted with terroir as well as how they expressed their expectations of and obligations
to one another. I was interested to ascertain how much the business practices of Jasper
Hill were based on the Comté model and how that would affect the economic
development of the region in which Jasper Hill is based, the Northeast Kingdom of
Vermont.
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I developed the following research questions for the project, using guidelines
developed in Dr. Teresa Mares’ Research Methods class:
1.) How has French government policy regulating Comté cheese as part of the AOC
quality label system impacted the economic development of the rural Franche-Comté
region?
2.) How have French and American constructions of agricultural origin-linked
intellectual property affected the regulation of their specialty/high end market cheeses,
namely Comté and Jasper Hill?
3.) How do actors along the supply chain of Jasper Hill frame their actions based on
commitments they perceive to have to their community and how do they interact with
what they understand to be their intellectual property?
4.) How could Vermont agricultural policies affecting cheesemakers be changed in order
to maximize the economic and cultural development of the rural regions in which those
high end market cheeses are made?
I conducted five interviews altogether, ranging from a half hour to two hours in
length. The participants included a sales manager for Jasper Hill, an owner of Jasper Hill,
a farmer who produces the milk for Alpha Tolman, a cheese buyer for a large urban East
Coast cheese shop, and, for a policy perspective, a leading American scholar of origin
products and the founder of the American Origin Products Association. These interviews
were semi-structured in order to allow for more free-form conversation about terroir and
cheese production, and in some cases the participants received the questions in advance
while in some cases they did not. This depended on the requests of the participants.
This research was reviewed by the Internal Review Board of the University of
Vermont, as is customary for all research involving human subjects. Research methods
used to maintain anonymity and maximum safety for all participants were employed in
order to gain IRB approval. These methods include the use of a research information
sheet and acquisition of verbal consent from all participants, as well as using pseudonyms
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for all interviewees mentioned in this work. Below is a table with these pseudonyms and
the role of the participant within the Jasper Hill supply chain.

Pseudonym:

Role:

Anna

Sales Manager

Joe

Owner

Don

Farmer

Caroline

American scholar of Geographical
Indications and policy
Cheese buyer at a large urban cheese shop

Richard

This project evolved enormously from its original goal, which was to simply look
at the rural economic development effects of Comté and compare them to the impact of
Jasper Hill on its local community. As I dove deeper into the theories behind
Geographical Indications and their management, I discovered that the fundamental
difference that seemed to separate American and European GI strategies seemed to be a
question of intellectual property. American IP, dominated by the private, market-based
trademark system, seemed irreconcilable with European collective IP strategies that
created a public good. I wondered how this had happened and whether, if intellectual
property proved too impossible a framework for origin product management in the
United States, another method might be possible.
Thus I became interested in the concept of cooperatives, first introduced to me as
an idea related to Geographical Indications by Dr. Elizabeth Barham. I saw what looked
like an opportunity for a unique type of GI management within this existing agricultural
structure. Cooperatives as they are legislated by the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 form a
11

type of legal monopoly, and thus are similar to a GI in that regard. Linking cooperative
structure to a geographical origin seemed like a natural, if sui generis, method of
achieving some of the rural economic development benefits that I had observed in Comté
and (to a smaller extent) Jasper Hill. Thus, I constructed my final recommendations with
this idea in mind.
This project has benefitted enormously from and would not have been possible
without the guidance of Dr. Amy Trubek, my advisor, as well as Dr. Elizabeth Barham
and Dr. Laurence Bérard. I am endlessly grateful that I have had the opportunity to work
on this project with these very inspirational women.
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Section 1: Geographical Indications in France
Today’s food production and distribution system, more globalized than ever
before, makes it difficult to imagine a time in which all food came directly from the area
around the consumer. Transportation, industrialization and a capitalist mindset have
allowed for an enormous global food network that feeds a population much larger than its
pre-industrial size while maintaining a high level of efficiency across the chain.
Consumer trends and movements in the second half of the 20th century in the United
States, such as the back-to-the-land movement of the 1960s and 70s or the growth of
organic production since the 1990s, resulted partly from disillusionment with this sterile,
industrial food system. (Cope, 2014; Kinstedt, 2012) They looked back to an imagined
time when connections between humans and the land around them were stronger and
deeper, seeing a need for “reconnection” between farmer and consumer, or product and
place. (Ilbery, Morris, Buller, Maye & Kneafsey, 2005) Thus emerged a market for
products that emphasized this connection, such as organic or local, another market
characterized by enormous growth in the 21st century. (Giovannucci, Barham & Pirog,
2009) However, in other parts of the world the labelling of origin-linked products came
earlier and as a result of different factors. In France, origin labeling arose from a more
practical concern: a protection against fraud.

History
In France, the Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC, in English translating to
Appellation of Controlled Origin) system of GIs emerged from a market emergency
resulting from a pest disaster in vineyards all over the country. The Phylloxera epidemic
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of the late 19th century, in which an insect native to North American ravaged the
grapevines of France, resulted in severely diminished wine production throughout the
country and an influx of fraud from producers of inferior wines labeling their bottles as
higher quality stock. Without any legal deterrent from doing so, the sale of mislabeled or
‘adulterated’ (wine with sugar, water or coloring added) poor quality wine increased and
the disillusionment of both French and global wine consumers with it. (Gangjee, 2012)
Producers of wines around the country banded together in order to lobby for legal
protection against the fraud that was destroying their business on top of their phylloxeraravaged vines. One of the worst hit regions was Champagne, and the resulting struggle by
producers to defend their vines involved much larger questions of control and
management among actors in the supply chain. The power of intermediate actors such as
négotiants in the Champagne supply chain was challenged, establishing a foundation for
the empowerment of producers, an “active peasantry willing to assert its collective vision
of Champagne and define its place within the community.” (Guy, 1997) Both producers
and négotiants continued to put pressure on the government to legally recognize the area,
and the first legal decree delimiting an area of production for a wine was for the region of
Champagne in 1908. This gave the government power to address and prosecute fraud on
the wine market. (Santilli, 2012)
However, the legal legitimization of the region of Champagne did not technically
constitute a Geographical Indication, as they did not yet exist as a legal concept. A
French law in 1919 established Geographical Indicators as a collective type of intellectual
property, but they did not receive an actual legal definition. The law also allowed for the
creation of unions for the protection of appellations of origin, called Syndicats de Défense
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de l’Appellation. Finally, in 1935 a decree law recognized appellations of controlled
origin through the creation of national committee to organize wine-producing AOCs:
l’Institut National des Appellations d’Origine, or the INAO. (Bérard, 2008)
AOC status remained limited to wine-producing regions until a law on July 2nd,
1990 extended protection to the entire agricultural sector. Today, AOC protection is
issued to over 360 alcohol products, 50 dairy products, and 45 products “agroalimentaires,” which essentially indicates everything else (fruits, vegetables, meats,
honeys, oils, etc). (INAO, n.d.) The AOC system serves as a model of reference for
evaluating origin-linked labeling, as it is the oldest of the European GI systems and
regarded as “the most strict and thoroughgoing of its kind.” (Barham, 2003) However, it
is certainly not the only model: 161 countries employ GI protection systems of some
kind, with the majority of protected products residing in OECD countries. (Giovannucci
et al., 2009) In the next subsection, I will present the current state of AOCs as well as two
other French GI labelling systems.

AOC, PGI and PDO: The Current State of GIs in France
AOC labeling may represent the depth of history within GIs in France, but two
other French labels are more prevalent and thus equally useful for a description of current
French GI policy. These labels are the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and
Protected Geographical Indication (PGI). To avoid confusion, I will use their English
names and abbreviations as they are commonly utilised. These two labels are used
throughout the European Union, but are managed in France by the INAO. This
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governmental organization holds utmost importance in the French management of GIs, so
I dedicate a later subsection to discussion of its role in GI management.
The INAO is in charge of seven different labeling systems in France, some of
which are origin-linked and some of which are oriented towards quality (the Label
Rouge, an indicator of superior quality) or production methods (Agriculture Biologique,
France’s version of organic production). (INAO, n.d.) However, this project focuses on
AOC, PDO and PGI because they are examples of GIs as opposed to simply labeling
systems.
These three Geographical Indications seem similar at first glance, but contain
many nuances that separate them from each other. These nuances have to do with the
degree of terroir exhibited by the product, the managing body, and whether the label is
France-specific or EU-wide. Provided below is a table outlining the differences between
these three GIs. They each differently answer the three essential questions of GI
protection outlined by Thévenod-Mottet & Marie-Vivien, 2011:
1. Who has the right (with more or less detailed specifications)?
2. How can illegitimate, incorrect or deceptive use be prevented or punished?
3. What are the characteristics of the product in relation with its heritage?

AOC

Definition

“Un signe français
qui désigne un
produit qui tire son
authenticité et sa
typicité de son
origine
géographique. Elle
est l'expression d'un
lien intime entre le
produit et son
terroir.” (INAO)

PDO

PGI

“A product whose quality
or characteristics “are
essentially or exclusively
due to a particular
geographical
environment with its
inherent natural and
human factors and the
production, processing
and preparation of which
take place in the defined

“A product which possesses a
specific quality, reputation or
other characteristics attributable
to that geographical origin, and
the production and/or
processing and/or preparation
of which take place in the
defined geographical area.”
(European Council)
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geographic area.”
(European Council)

Legislative Origin

Decree of July 30th,
1935

EU 2081/92, amended 5
October 2006

EU 2081/92, amended 5
October 2006

Link to Terroir

Characteristics of
product are
exclusively due to
natural/human
factors within area of
production. “Le
produit qui en est
issu ne peut être
reproduit hors de son
terroir.” (INAO)

Characteristics of product
are exclusively due to
natural/human factors
within area of
production.

Characteristics of product can
be due to natural/human factors,
but focus is on
reputation/historical links
between product and place. “Un
produit dont toutes les phases
d'élaboration ne sont pas
nécessairement issues de la
zone géographique éponyme
mais qui bénéficie d'un lien à un
territoire et d'une notoriété.”
(INAO)

Area of Jurisdiction

France

European Union

European Union

Supervising/Protective
Body

INAO

INAO-approved,
producer-independent
organizations supervise,
INAO investigates fraud

INAO

Source: Author, with information from Bérard & Marchenay, 2008; INAO, n.d.; Sylvander & Barham,
2011

As illustrated in the table, the main difference between PDOs and PGIs lies in
their definition, related to the degree of their link to terroir. Put more simply, a PGI does
not have to be exclusively fabricated in the delineated region (like a PDO must), and the
link between the product and the area can be a little more abstract. The linkage can be
reputation based, rooted in a historical tradition of production.
However, this more abstract linkage between taste and place that is found in PGI
registration can lead to disputes related to intellectual property and ownership of
traditions. One example, noted by Geographical Indications scholar Dev Gangjee (2006),
is the Melton Mowbray pork pie. This product originates in the Melton Mowbray region
17

of England and was the subject of a legal controversy when the producers in the region
attempted to apply for a PGI that would exclude some industrial producers on the
outskirts of the area by means of delimitation. To claim regional ownership of a product
in which the factors of production are all rooted in the area, as with a PDO, is hard
enough, let alone to legally protect an “origin-linked” pork pie from which all the inputs
come from elsewhere. Gangjee (2006) notes, “as the subject-matter of GIs expanded to
include traditional products based more on reputational links to their places of origin,
constructed around cultural, historical, or socio-economic moorings rather than on
scientifically verifiable natural features, establishing clearly defined boundaries has
become more problematic.” Nonetheless, someone has to establish the boundaries, and
the next subsection is centered around the role of the INAO in delimiting areas of
production and enforcing the cahier des charges.

INAO: The Role of the Government in GI Management
l’INAO, l’Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité, supervises all existing
GIs in France and is responsible for the registration and delimitation of new GI products.
They are a government funded organization with a mission of four extremely complicated
tasks: 1) proposing the recognition of eligible products (“eligible” meaning to fit the
definition of a geographic indication), 2) recognizing organizations “de défense et de
gestion” (of defense and management) for the products, 3) ensuring the respect of the
cahier des charges by producers and taking sanctioning measures in case of disrespect,
and 4) contributing to the defense and promotion of all their labels of quality and origin,
in France and abroad. (INAO, 2011) Their staff is comprised of industry professionals,
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qualified experts and members of official departments and agencies. (Marie-Vivien,
2011)
These tasks are enormous, considering the number of products the INAO
supervises. Different processes of recognition of products exist depending on the type of
product - there is a committee for wines and alcohols, a committee for dairy and other
agro-food products, and committees for each separate label administered by the INAO.
(INAO, 2007)
The guide to recognition for an AOC/AOP non-alcohol product is 46 pages long
and illustrates the many steps that are involved in the process of becoming a recognized
geographical indication. The process is necessarily lengthy, because of the difficulty of
creating a legal framework for a somewhat abstract product, and involves an amount of
bureaucracy that seems particularly French. Producers must describe their cahier des
charges (on which every producer in the region must agree), as well as elect an
Organisme de Défense et de Gestion (organism of protection and management), who
serves as a liaison between the INAO and the producer group. This organization is an
“independent, impartial and competent certification body” that removes some of the
responsibility for production control from the state. (Marie-Vivien, 2011) The producers
must also delimit the area of production, which rightly can lead to conflict owing to the
inclusion or exclusion of certain producers and the fluidity of geographical boundaries
over time. (INAO, 2007)
Designating the area of production for an AOC, PDO or PGI is naturally
complicated, as the borders can arise from either political or geographical boundaries. In
the case of a product with multiple stages of production (cheese, for example), particular
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“zones” must be designated in which each stage of production exclusively takes place.
These delineated borders are chosen for their “lien au terroir”, and theoretically, any
product made within that area meeting the criteria for production would fit within the
AOC/PDO/PGI definition. (INAO, 2000) Designating this area is the role of the producer
group applying for the AOC/PDO/PGI status with the help of the commission d’experts
within the INAO.
Following the thorough and complicated application process, the application for
registration is passed along to a series of INAO committees, eventually landing in the
hands of the national committee. (INAO, 2011) Upon approval, the product is monitored
and supervised by an agent from one of the 26 INAO offices throughout France.
(Barham, 2003)
One extremely successful example of an AOC product managed by the INAO is
Comté. This cheese serves as my first case study illustrating the interactions between
government policy and Geographical Indications, resulting in particular rural economic
development effects. In Section 2, I will provide an in-depth look at the filière (network)
of Comté and the positive impacts it has conferred on the region of the Franche-Comté.
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Section 2: A Case Study in Comté
As the most consumed AOC cheese in France, Comté occupies an important
cultural and economic position in the country. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) It is often cited as
an example of rural economic development success by proponents of the AOC system
and of GIs in general, and thus much research has been done into its management and
regulation systems. Comté also serves as an inspiration for the Cellars at Jasper Hill, the
second case study described in the paper, and for all these reasons I have chosen it as an
example of French GI effects on rural economic development. I briefly spent time in the
Franche-Comté in 2014, began to understand its importance to the area, and I present it
here in an economic context in order to frame the comparison with the American artisanal
cheese made at Jasper Hill.

Comté: The Basics
Comté cheese is a raw cow’s milk semi-hard aged cheese produced in the
Franche-Comté region of France. This political boundary consists of the departments of
Doubs, Jura, Haute-Saône and Territoire de Belfort on the eastern side of France.
Geographically, the Franche-Comté consists of the Jura Mountains as well as many
forested areas, thus both plateau dairy grazing and use of wood are major factors in
Comté production. (Behr, 2005) The cheesemaking history of the region goes back to the
12th century, when mountain farmers were forced to convert their milk into enormous
cheeses in order to preserve them for the winter. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) The recipe and
methods have evolved and been perfected ever since, and today roughly 1,500,000
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wheels are produced each year, each weighing an average of 80 pounds. (Comté USA,
2013)
The delineated AOC zone of Comté differs somewhat from the political borders
of the Franche-Comté - it is smaller, consisting of the departments of Doubs, Jura and a
small part of Ain. The zone was first created by the producer’s association in 1958 for
AOC status application. Much like the original wine AOCs, the push for AOC
designation for Comté came from a need to fight fraud: producers wanted to distinguish
themselves from lower quality gruyère cheeses produced outside of Comté. (Colinet,
Desquilbet, Hassan, Monier-Dilhan, Orozco, & Réquillart, 2006) This producer’s
association in 1963 would become the Comité Interprofessionnelle de Gruyère de Comté
(CIGC). (Bowen, 2010) The CIGC represents all actors along the supply chain, from the
producers to the fruitières (cooperatives) that pool the milk to the affineurs (cheese
agers).

AOC Comté area. Source: http://www.ethnographiques.org/2003/Dumain
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Franche-Comté region. Source: http://www.arsenal-modelist.com/index.php?page=carte

This level of production requires serious organization and coordination among
actors - la confiance organisationnelle, or organizational trust, is considered by scholars
to be just as important as price or contracts in the coordination of Comté. (Torre, 2001)
Cheesemaking in which actors are so reliant upon each other for creation of the final
product differs greatly from other types of standardized, centralized production systems.
The variety of actors within the filière goes far beyond just producers, laitières, and
affineurs: suppliers of inputs, distributors, those involved in agrotourism and many others
are affected by the Comté structure. (Fumey & Bèrion, 2010)
All these different actors rely on each other to produce a high-quality product,
meeting the standards elaborated in the cahier des charges, in order to generate economic
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rent and bring value (both monetary and nonmonetary) to the region. This confiance
organisationnelle is defined to be “une extension de la relation de confiance
interpersonnelle (relation de face à face) au principe de l’action collective.” Actors along
the chain rely on each other for their livelihoods, but often have also formed close ties
that fall on both sides of the personal/professional relationship spectrum. This results in a
unique form of collectivism in which both explicit (outlined by production contracts) and
implicit (defined by everyday interactions) trust are prevalent and necessary. (Torre,
2001)
This collective structure revolves around the use of fruitières, cooperatives of
milk producers who supply the base product for Comté. Creating huge wheels of Comté
required a lot of milk, so producers organized themselves into this collective structure
that continues to be in use today. They have been solidified within the cahier des charges
for Comté, which specifies that the milk for the fruitières must come from a within a 25
kilometer radius of the facility. (Behr, 2005) The milk from the fruitières makes up 86%
of the supply for Comté, while the rest is produced by private firms. (Bowen, 2010)
Many other aspects of Comté that have evolved over time have been formalized
by the cahier des charges. Comté must be made from the milk of Montbéliarde cows or,
very occasionally, Simmental. Roughly 130,000 of these cows on 2700 farms provide the
milk for Comté, and Comté dairy farms make up 570,000 acres of land, the largest of any
AOC cheese. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) Very specific regulations exist for the production of
milk for Comté: no fermented feed (silage) is allowed, the cows are required to be on
pasture from May until October, and each cow must have a hectare of grazing area.
(Behr, 2005) The 15 aging facilities must age their wheels for at least 4 months, with an
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average age of 8 months but some rare varieties getting up to 2 years or more. (Comté
USA 2013)

Economic Impacts of Comté

Though 130,000 cows on an area of land smaller than the size of Rhode Island
may not seem like a huge economic powerhouse, it certainly has a formidable impact on
the area of the Franche-Comté. The Comité Interprofessionnelle de Gruyère de Comté
(CIGC) is the representative group for actors all along the supply chain and responsible
for marketing of Comté on a national and international scale, as well as serving as a
liaison between the INAO and the actors themselves. They have been extremely
successful, as sales of Comté have been increasing since the 1990s. (Mérel, 2008) Their
operating costs are covered by the sale of Comté labels to the cooperatives - that is
considered their contribution to the CIGC - as well as some public grant money. (Gerz &
Dupont, 2006) The Comté USA website cites 7,600 jobs in the AOC region as being
directly associated with Comté, but indirect jobs such as in agrotourism or in production
of inputs or supplies are not included. Further, one study claims that Comté produces 5
times more employment per liter of milk than its generic competitor, Emmental.
(Giovannucci et al., 2009)
Economic impacts of AOC Comté production on the Franche-Comté are not
purely employment-related. Much of the rationale for AOC legislation and for GI
labelling in general is based on the idea of economic rent, or any positive difference
between the payment made for a factor of production and its cost. Producers of GIs are
likely to command a higher price for their goods, paid by consumers in order to avoid
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asymmetric information and the risk of buying non-guaranteed quality products. (Réviron
& Chappuis, 2011) Comté is no exception to this. Milk producers for AOC Comté
consistently are paid more for their product than the average milk price in France.
Statistics vary, but one study claims a 16% price premium for Comté milk producers
between 1991 and 2004. (Colinet et al., 2006)

Source: Colinet et al., 2006

Rents commanded for AOC products over generic competitors can be vastly
different depending on the product. For Comté, the best comparison to make is with
Emmental, another pressed semi-hard cheese originating from the same mountainous
region. These two cheeses began with many similarities, but their filières diverged with
opposite strategies. Comté relies on the AOC structure to derive value from smaller-scale
production, while Emmental followed an industrial method with no name or origin
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protection. Thus, it has largely been moved to cheaper parts of the country in which to
produce and is sold in mass quantities, often as shredded cheese. (Dupont, 2003)
Today six different countries produce Emmental, distributing its value among
producers rather than concentrating it in one area. The price paid for Emmental is
significantly lower than the price paid for Comté, with a 7% difference in price in 1991
increasing to a 24% difference in 2001. Part of that difference is a result of increasing
supermarket power over producers of generic, industrialized cheeses - it’s a retailer’s
market, as they have many different producers to choose from. (Dupont, 2003) Further,
production of Comté has increased every year while production of Emmental has fallen,
due to superior supply controls and quality improvement on the part of Comté. (Gerz &
Dupont, 2006)
The associated economic benefits of producing Comté allow the dairy industry to
continue to flourish in the area. Many farmers are aware of this potential benefit and
choose to join the Comté filière - between 60-70% of the milk produced in the eligible
zone is designated for Comté production. (Mérel, 2008) Agriculture is not the dominant
industry, making up only 3.6% of all jobs in the Doubs and Jura, but 60% of all
agricultural land is utilised for Comté milk production. (Bowen, 2010)
Agrotourism is also increased by the installation and legislation of AOC Comté,
which brings another kind of economic and cultural value to the area. Five percent of
farms engage in some kind of tourist activity in the Comté AOC area, as opposed to three
percent in the Franche-Comté as a whole. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) Tourists who visit
because of their attraction to Comté will frequent other businesses and services in the
area, particularly producers of other AOC products, expanding economic effect. In 2002,
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115,000 people visited cheesemaking facilities and 30,000 visited aging facilities.
(Colinet et al., 2006)
Production of Comté has been influenced by changing markets, both domestically
and abroad. Trends in packaging resulted in prepackaged cheese surpassing block cheese
as the dominant seller, and exports have increased over time to countries such as the U.S.,
Germany and Belgium. However, the majority of consumption remains in the area,
“probably because it is well known and seen as authentic there.” (Gerz & Dupont, 2006)
Comté is certainly sold with a certain kind of story, the story of an ages-old cheese
originating from a bucolic, rural area and resulting in a “pure, healthy and natural food.”
(Comté USA, 2013)
The marketing of Comté by the CIGC emphasizes the typicity and terroir of the
cheeses, stating that “each wheel of Comté reveals a distinct aromatic composition that
varies according the micro-region where it was produced, the local microflora, the season
in which the cheese was made, the distinctive style of the cheesemaker, the cellar where
it was matured.” (Comté USA, 2013) This description, on the English language version
of the Comté website, emphasizes all the aspects of terroir and typicity without using
those actual words, which are less culturally known in the United States.
Effects of AOC Comté on the Franche-Comté are not solely economic. One
argument for the protection of geographical indications is in regards to the potential
benefits of preserving traditional methods of production, which might ordinarily be lost
to the pressures of industrialization and lowering the bottom line. (Bérard & Marchenay,
2008) In the case of Comté, these methods involve all steps of the cheese making
process, from the raising of the milk itself to the production and aging of the cheese.
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Comté requires the use of grass and hay for feed as opposed to silage, which less
expensive as an input but can impart an undesirable sour flavor upon the cheese. (Behr,
2005) Milk must be processed within 24 hours to preserve its characteristics, and copper
tanks are used in place of more modern stainless steel in order to improve natural taste.
The cheese must mature on a spruce board, which improves the absorption of humidity.
The 4 month aging period is necessary for the development of the very specific flavor
profile that Comté affineurs search for. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) All these specific
regulations date back to the original production of Comté and thus could easily have been
lost to market pressures without AOC status. Instead, these methods of production
become part of the Comté story that is sold to consumers and add high quality to the
product to distinguish it on the market.
The preservation of this rural landscape may be attributable to AOC Comté as
well. Gerz & Dupont, 2006 state that “migration away from the Comté AOC area is only
half of that in the non-AOC area,” which keeps younger people in the area and maintains
engagement with the the filière and interest in preserving the agricultural tradition. Comté
has also helped to mitigate the loss of dairy farms in general. Between 1988 and 2000,
France lost 50% of its dairy farms (note that this is number of farms, not amount of
farmland). Non-AOC production zones lost even more, at 57%, while the Franche-Comté
fared better at -42% and the zone Comté at -36%. (Dupont, 2003)
Rural environmental preservation is also an effect of Comté production, as the
French government tends to be more strict with environmental regulations for its AOC
producers than for non-AOC agriculture. (Barham, 2003) Pasture dairy farming typically
retains more nutrients in the soil and limits erosion more than grain-fed confinement
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operations. Though grassland is still lost in the AOC Comté area, is it being lost at a
slower rate than in the non-AOC area. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006) Fewer herbicides and
pesticides are utilized in the Franche-Comté as well, as illustrated below.

Taken from Giovannucci et al., 2009

The case of AOC Comté illustrates the positive effects of AOC legislation on the
local community that produces a good, though this effect is not universal to all AOC
products. In this particular case, concentration of economic rent and benefits as well as
preservation of methods and environment are demonstrated by the contrast with nonAOC Emmental. Comté is a very particular success of the AOC method, which, as we
have seen earlier in the chapter, can be incredibly complicated and a source of much
conflict between actors both inside and outside of the chain of production. Preservation of
this particular kind of community-based intellectual property has been particularly
effective, likely in part because of the centuries of history behind the cheese and the
decades of legislative protection it has enjoyed.
In Sections 1 and 2, French utilisation of Geographical Indications was discussed,
particularly the AOC, PDO and PGI methods. The case study of Comté was utilized as an
example of extreme success of this particular method of legislating intellectual property
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as it relates to origin-linked products. However, this method is not the only way or
necessarily the best way. It is simply the way that has resulted from a history of
interaction between policies and industry. In the United States, a very different way of
dealing with intellectual property and with the dairy industry has arisen. In Sections 4 and
5, I will provide a history of U.S. dairy policies and use another case study as an example
of a different kind of success. Before that, however, in Section 3 I will illustrate some of
the conflicts that have arisen between the U.S. and France as a result of these sometimes
opposing strategies of IP and of dairy policy in general.
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Section 3: U.S. vs. EU Clash
The purpose of this section is to give a practical context to the comparison
between U.S. and EU management of intellectual property and origin products within an
agricultural framework. Talking about IP and GIs can be somewhat theoretical, and I had
difficulty finding sources that addressed both the ideologies behind GIs and trademarks
as well as their real-word effects manifested in free trade and other types of multilateral
agreements. This section is an attempt to bring together those two types of literature, in
order to better frame the comparison between the two nations analyzed within the
document and their associated case studies.

GIs vs. Trademarks: Two Conflicting Regimes?
The process of acquiring GI recognition like AOC, PDO or PDI status differs
greatly from the U.S. system of trademark protection used for intellectual property rights.
One primary difference lies in the applicant in each process - in the AOC process, a
group of producers applies for a label that will be owned by the government on their
behalf as long as they follow the cahier des charges and reside within the area, while the
trademark process is carried out by a single entity for private ownership. A trademark can
be bought and sold, and has an expiration date of protection depending on the country of
registration. In the United States, the duration of a trademark is ten years and the owner
must re-file the application to continue the rights to the mark. (Josling, 2006) Below is a
table which visually represents some of the differences between trademarks,
Geographical Indications, and another type of mark, collective marks (described later in
the subsection).

32

Trademarks

Geographical
Indications

Collective marks

Identifier

Identifies a producer

Identifies a place of origin

Identifies quality, can
identity a place of
origin

Owner

One producer/firm

State, on behalf of
producers within an area

Certification body
owns, but cannot use

Means of
Protection

Role of firm with help of courts,
no public intervention

Public agencies (such as the
INAO)

Collective responsible
for protection of
members

Transferability

Can be bought/sold/licensed

Cannot be
bought/sold/licensed

Cannot be transferred

Cost

Expensive for small firms

Inexpensive for small firms,
expensive for groups

Inexpensive

Conflicts

Cannot contain GIs (unless
grandfathered) if they mislead the
consumer

Coexists with trademarks
and collective marks

Coexists with GIs and
trademarks

Duration

Must be renewed every 10 years

Continuous, unless change
in conditions

Subject to renewal

Source: Adapted from Josling, 2006

Trademarks represent a fundamentally different economic strategy than
geographical indications, one that reflects a neoliberal free-market ideal of private
ownership of intellectual property. They are used to “identify and distinguish the source
of the goods from one party from those of others,” they exclude other parties from using
a mark and thus decrease fraud, and they encourage brand loyalty among consumers.
(USPTO, 2015) Trademarks are largely a private-sector tool, related to competition, with
the only role of the public sphere being for enforcement. (Josling, 2006)
Geographic Indications, on the other hand, represent essentially a public good. A
public good is, in economic terms, a good which is non-rivalrous (the use of it does not
leave less of it for another consumer, like paid television subscriptions) and nonexcludable (one party cannot keep another from using it, like timber or coal stocks).
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When both these conditions are met, a public good is created - something like a
lighthouse, or, on a large scale, national defense. Geographical indications are a public
good because anyone in the designated area can use them, and their use (the use of the
name of the good on a label) does not leave any less for anyone else. They are often
referred to in INAO documents as “un patrimoine collectif,” meaning a shared heritage,
and thus are treated as the right of everyone to the use of their land and history (albeit for
monetary gain). (INAO, 2011) As Norbert Olszak, scholar of geographical indications,
notes, “les indications géographiques représentent un droit collectif qui s’exerce
individuellement.” (Olszak, 2001)
Use requirements for trademarks and Geographical Indications also vary, another
characteristic which points towards a public/private distinction between the two. The
protection of a trademark under law is dependent on its use: under the US Lanham Trade
Marks Act of 1947, proprietors of a trademark must show evidence of its use upon every
re-registration of the mark. “Use” in this instance refers to private sector utilisation such
as advertising and sales. (Cornish, 2004) GIs are never “re-registered” in any way and
thus their use is less important to their continued existence, though a GI that falls into
disuse is subject to becoming a generic term. This is more of a sociocultural than a legal
distinction, however, and one that is contentiously debated. (Gangjee, 2012) Thus,
availability of GIs for public use is less dependent on market interactions than trademark
status. Generic status for GIs is discussed later in this chapter.
However, GIs differ from typical public goods because they result in personal
and/or collective monetary gain, as opposed to a public good like a national park, which
is enjoyed by all but does not make money for those who visit it. Because money is

34

involved, and because the public good is also a form of intellectual property, problems of
ownership still arise. There is no clear decree or law anywhere in the French system that
states the owner or title holder of a Geographical Indication - the state is the assumed
owner because the INAO, a government organization, manages the labels and holds
governing power. However, the lack of clear delimitation between the public and private
sphere can lead to complications, particularly with the trademark system on an
international scale. (Olszak, 2001)
One compromise between the two systems is another form of intellectual property
referred to as a collective mark. These are marks “adopted by a "collective" (i.e., an
association, union, cooperative, fraternal organization, or other organized collective
group) for use only by its members, who in turn use the mark to identify their goods or
services and distinguish them from those of nonmembers.” (USPTO, n.d.) The collective
itself does not sell goods or perform services, but promotes and advertises the goods of
the members of the group. The collective owns the rights to the mark together, though it
follows many of the same principles as a typical trademark in that it can be sold and
requires a 10-year reapplication process. These marks exist in France but are secondary to
GIs both in legislative rights and cultural merit. In the United States, “le droit des
marques est très important et leur souveraineté sur tout autre signe distinctif semble
certain.” (Olszak, 2001) The nature of trademark and GI legislation is also deeply
different - trademark policies tend to be concerned with fair or unfair competition, while
GI policy framed as an issue of consumer information (Josling, 2006) This fundamental
difference between the United States and France in the hierarchy of intellectual property
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marks is the root of many conflicts in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and in the trade policies of these countries in general.
The TRIPS Agreement, an international accord that is part of the larger General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is responsible for the universal definition of
Geographical Indications used in the introduction to this paper. TRIPS is one of the most
important documents and partnerships that governs origin-linked labeling, and an
important piece of literature to understand in order to grasp the current state of
Geographical Indications across both sides of the Atlantic. In the next subsection, I will
outline its origins and the issues at stake, in order to demonstrate the different interests
represented by the U.S. and the E.U. in their negotiations of this agreement.

TRIPS: An International Agreement with Rural Implications
Reconciling the many different existing types of GIs on the global market and
their associated intellectual property regimes was one aim of this international agreement,
negotiated in 1994. (Rao & Guru, 2003) The 116 participating nations signed the
document, resulting in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for
enforcement of the rules they had established. (Kinstedt, 2012) TRIPS sets minimum
standards for intellectual property protection for WTO members, attempting to balance
innovation and free economic competition as well as maintain a “vibrant public domain”
from which new ideas can be produced. (Raustiala & Munzer, 2007) Its importance is
noted among scholars as “the genesis of contemporary global-scale battles over the
appropriate normative pitch of intellectual property law.” (Ruth, 2007) Geographical
Indications and trademarks are just one of its aspects, but important ones nonetheless.
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TRIPS was preceded by several multilateral conventions in the field of
intellectual property: The Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions (the first in 1883 and the
last in 1961) were all conducted by developed countries in the interest of strengthening
global intellectual property rights. (Rao & Guru, 2003) Several agreements, administered
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), also set precedent for Articles
22-24 of TRIPS, the portion of the document dealing with GIs. These include: the Madrid
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods
(1891), and the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their
International Registration (1958). (Rao & Guru, 2003) TRIPS established the widelyused global definition for GIs in 1994 and their formalization in that document has
resulted in their transfer from the “national, bilateral or plurilateral...to the multilateral
stage.” (Josling, 2006)
Though it has been over 20 years since the construction of TRIPS, negotiations
are by no means over. The Uruguay Round of the GATT established a framework of
negotiation, but the details were left to be ironed out by committees. (Kinstedt, 2012)
Thus, the issues that surround TRIPS are still extremely relevant to a discussion of cheese
legislation and intellectual property.
TRIPS requires all participating countries to implement an intellectual property
regime that recognizes geographical indicators, and member states cannot refuse to
recognize an origin product from another member state. This “minimum standard” of
protection is framed as a consumer protection issue, which has to be proven, and an
unfair competition issue, which is judged by a court. (Thévenod-Mottet & Marie-Vivien,
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2011) The institution of a Dispute Settlement Panel within the WTO helps to resolve
conflicts with product recognition and fraud. (Josling, 2006)
Article 22 of TRIPS requires all member states to “provide the legal means” to
prevent use of a geographical name, directly or indirectly, from misleading the public as
to the origin of the good. (Gangjee, 2012) However, TRIPS itself does not dictate how
member states must provide this protection - autonomy is left to the signed members as to
the enforcement of the treaty. In the United States, according to Rao & Guru, 2003, “If
the provisions of the agreement are not inconsistent with the country’s constitution, it is
considered that no further action of incorporation into the country’s law is necessary.”
Thus, the U.S. can decide how to “provide the legal means” to prevent unfair
competition.
This is how the trademark system remains the dominant method of protection for
geographical indications in the United States. Trademarks are a legal means to prevent
the use of a geographical sign on a product that does not hail from the indicated region or
area because the U.S. will not register a misleading trademark. (Rao & Guru, 2003) The
U.S. does not recognize GIs “as a separate class of intellectual property,” but protects
them legally via trademark law. (Josling, 2006)
The most major conflict arises in regards to trademarks that are registered which
already exist as geographical indications, or vice versa. This is not uncommon.
Trademarks using geographic names are not allowed to be registered, but some are
allowed if over time “consumers have come to recognize those terms as identifying the
product of a particular company or group of producers.” This is considered a ‘secondary
meaning’ or ‘acquired distinctiveness,’ which is eligible for application for trademark

38

status. (Josling, 2006) Certainly, proving this secondary meaning or acquired
distinctiveness could be extremely difficult and still result in consumer confusion over
the true origin of the product.
Article 22 of TRIPS, regarding GI protection, interestingly differs from other
articles of the Agreement in that the two sides of debate are overwhelmingly U.S. - E.U.,
as opposed to North-South or Developed-Developing. (Rao & Guru, 2003) This marks a
distinction in philosophies from other types of intellectual property rights, such as patents
or copyrights. In those later cases, dominance of globalized markets by developed nations
leads to systems of IPR that favor those nations. However, the majority of valuable
intellectual property in regards to GIs lies overwhelmingly in the U.S. and EU, thus the
debate is primarily waged between those two camps and their allies. (Raustiala &
Munzer, 2007) In the case of GIs, two highly developed powers have fundamentally
different understandings and paradigms of how to administer ownership of origin labels.
Clearly, there still exists an enormous amount of ambiguity amongst member states about
how to best integrate these systems, and no party (particularly within the U.S. - E.U.
debate) seems willing to move very far towards compromise.
The debate has gone so far as the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, created for the
purpose of resolving disputes between members states arising from TRIPS. The U.S. in
1999 argued to the panel that TRIPS did not afford equal protection to U.S. trademark
holders as it did to EU GIs, which violates the WTO principle of ‘national treatment,’
meaning that domestic and foreign products should be subject to the same rules. Australia
joined the complaint in 2003, and in 2005 the panel ruled on the U.S./Australia side. The
result of this ruling was that the EU had to allow holders of pre-existing trademarks to
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prevent use of confusing geographical indications, not just the other way around.
(Josling, 2006)
TRIPS is little known outside of law and intellectual property circles, but it has
serious implications for agriculture and for rural development in the United States,
Europe and in developing countries. (Barham, 2003). The EU and U.S. are still in the
midst of a battle for the rights to use various GI names, ever since 2005 when the EU
made a list of 41 Geographical Indications that they wanted to “claw back” from public
use and claim as the property of EU members. These names included globally produced
products such as feta and Gorgonzola, so the U.S. and other non-EU nations were - and
are - opposed to the attempt. (Kerr, 2006) If the EU were to successfully claim its
Geographical Indications back, there could be enormous consequences for both large and
small producers of those products. Europe would possess the rights to the names of
“almost all of the economically important cheeses of the world,” and U.S. producers
would have to make drastic changes to the production and marketing of their cheeses.
(Kindstedt, 2012)
Thus, the ownership of certain food names the crux of the argument between the
European Union and the United States. U.S. negotiators argue that cheese names like feta
or Gorgonzola are ‘generic,’ a term indicating that consumers view the product as
designating “a class name or category of all of the goods/services of the same type, rather
than of a geographic origin.” (Giovannucci et al., 2009) Article 24 of TRIPS allows that it
is not obligatory for member states to provide protection for geographical indications that
have become “a generic term for describing the product in question.” This idea is very
contentious, as it is the domain of the member states to decide which geographical
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indications are generic and no longer need protection. (Rao & Guru, 2003) A
geographical indication becoming generic is akin to the failure to re-register a trademark;
an unregistered trademark and a generic geographical indication lose their status as
protected intellectual property and are thus available for use by any producer who cares
to make the product or use the name. The U.S. and EU are continuing to fight this battle
in a more current and more controversial free-trade agreement titled the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, also dealing with GIs and generic status, expected to
be passed in early 2015. (Traynor & Rice-Oxley, 2015)
Opposition to GIs among U.S. producers takes the form of an organization called
the Consortium for Common Food Names (CCFN), a lobbying group led by the U.S.
Dairy Export Council. (CCFN, n.d.) They describe themselves as “an independent,
international non-profit alliance,” though there may be larger political factors at play
within this organization, according to one interviewee. Caroline, who serves as a liaison
between American producers of origin products and policymakers, pointed out that the
U.S. Dairy Export Council is funded by check-off money (money collected from milk
producers by the USDA) that is supposed to go to funding the marketing orders (a
government-implemented price control system). Both these terms will be explained in a
later section, but one interviewee says it best: “In other words, these people that work for
the Dairy Export Council on dairy check-off money which is gathered up by USDA as a
taxing mechanism to administer marketing orders, they are lobbying directly U.S.
Congress, Senate and House.”
This is one example of the interactions between the dairy industry in America,
dairy policies and Geographical Indications as they relate to intellectual property. Many
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different interests are represented and many issues are at stake, just as within the French
dairy system. The next section is a case study of one American producer making an
origin-linked cheese: the Cellars at Jasper Hill, whose tagline is “The Taste of Place.”
While focusing on innovation and working within an American culture that values the
individual, Jasper Hill utilizes a collective, community-focused approach that in some
ways resembles (and was explicitly inspired by) the AOC Comté model. This case study
demonstrates their navigation between two different cheesemaking worlds and how it
effects the rural economy around them.
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Section 4: A Case Study of Jasper Hill
The Cellars at Jasper Hill is a $3 million dollar cheese aging facility carved into
the side of grassy knoll in Greensboro, Vermont. Greensboro has a population of 762,
though the town website states that in the summer this population grows to “well over
2000.” (Greensboro Town Website, n.d.) The Orleans County Historical Society provides
a rich history of the town, dating back to 1781, which features the names of several
places and people that might be familiar to a cheese aficionado: Mr. Moses Sleeper, the
Bayley-Hazen Military Road, and Mr. Alpha Tolman. (Old Stone House Museum, n.d.)
These famous Greensboro names have a life far beyond the boundaries of this remote
town as award-winning cheeses on an international market. They have tremendously
altered the political and economic landscape of this seemingly bucolic and quiet area of
Vermont.
For the past 11 years, Andy and Mateo Kehler have been producing awardwinning cheeses at Jasper Hill Farm, gradually expanding and diversifying their business
and valorizing their reputation among artisan cheesemakers. Their current operation now
includes the Cellar facility, an underground cheese cave that serves to age both the
cheeses made at their farm and those made by other cheesemakers in the state. Cheeses
marketed under Jasper Hill’s label are sold across the country in upscale coastal urban
cheese shops, though they can also be found down the street from Jasper Hill at Wiley’s
Corner Store, a local family market. When asked about the reputation of the Cellars,
Richard, a cheese buyer for a top New York City cheese store responded, “They’re the
top. And they’ll probably be humble about it, but that’s the reality.” The business holds
not only symbolic but economic value as well. As far back as 2005, before the addition of
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the Cellars, Jasper Hill was already adding $300,000 a year to the local economy. In
2009, the second year of operating the Cellars, they shipped 70,000 pounds of cheese.
(Behr, 2010)
One cheese made by Jasper Hill and aged in the Cellars is named Alpha Tolman,
after a dairy farmer from the 1900’s whose farm still exists in Greensboro. Alpha Tolman
serves as the focus of my case study because of how it is made. Jasper Hill uses a unique
management and ownership structure to produce a concentrated economic impact and
increase the viability of their business, and this structure was influenced by the highly
organized strategy of Comté producers within their AOC framework. This has resulted in
a vertical integration of the factors of production of their cheese that allows for further
control over its final outcome.
Though owners Andy and Mateo Kehler are clearly in charge, they are supported
by 50 employees who all deal in different aspects of the business: salespeople,
accountants, farmers, cheesemakers, affineurs, and others all come together under one
$2.5 million dollar payroll. (Personal communication, December 11th, 2014) Jasper Hill
owns the Cellars as well as their own farm, and the acquisition of Andersonville Farm for
the production of Alpha Tolman and Bayley Hazen Blue in 2014 further increased
concentration. This transaction will be discussed later in the chapter.
The characteristics and qualities of Comté that have influenced the production
strategies of Jasper Hill were the basis of how I began this project. I wanted to look at an
American-made new-world cheese inspired by an old-world one, in order to compare
their regulatory framework and hypothesize as to whether and how origin-linked labeling
would be possible in the United States.
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I conducted in-depth interviews along the supply chain of Alpha Tolman, with
four actors directly involved in the market for the cheese and one actor experienced in
legislation and policy of origin-linked products. The themes conveyed by the interview
responses are elaborated within this chapter, providing insight into how Jasper Hill
perceives their economic impact on the community around them and how that affects
their actions as well as how they interact with what might be considered their intellectual
property.

Clothbound Cheddar aging in the Cellars at Jasper Hill. Source: Author
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How Jasper Hill Interprets Community
Defining and operationalizing the meaning and delimitation of the “community”
surrounding Jasper Hill was one objective of my interview process, particularly in my
interviews with Joe, an owner, and with Anna, a sales manager for Jasper Hill. I was
welcomed to the facility several times and was generously given the time, energy, and
insights of these two actors, as well as others I met at the Cellars. The Cellars are not
technically open to the public, but I attended a tour of the facility with several other
interested parties, including a group of cheesemongers from a small grocery co-op in
New Hampshire and one evidently curious consumer visiting from New York City. Thus,
Jasper Hill certainly isn’t a secret by any means. However, the process of learning about
the deeper rationale for their actions and methods certainly made me feel as if I had a
privileged, insider position.
The community rhetoric employed by Joe and Anna is noticeably oriented around
expressions of control, a framework of thought that could be natural to people who
harness the natural world around them for economic benefit. This control is expressed
through a sense of agency and leadership in making change in the community, using
active verbs like create and build. Anna referred to “creating a culture that supports what
we’re doing,” and Joe remarked that Jasper Hill “actually [employs] a person whose job
it is to build community.” Anna also stated that at Jasper Hill they “have to be very
intentional about [the way they create a positive sphere for their operations], you can’t
just expect it to spontaneously erupt,” echoing sentiments she expressed about cultivating
a particular environment for microflora in order to produce specific results in the cheese
itself.
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Certainly the immediate spatial community of Greensboro and Orleans County
holds a lot of meaning in the decision making of Jasper Hill. Anna in particular
elaborated on this awareness of immediate community, saying “we feel that we’re
making a big impact on our sparsely populated subarctic northeast kingdom, and the
people are really important.” Neither Joe nor Anna expressed any specific opposition
they have faced among local residents to their operation or methods, though they seem to
be highly aware of the perception of their business by people around them. This is
exemplified by Joe’s opinion that, “within our local community...we also experience, I
think, what I would consider envy. People can think...that we’re just made of money, but
we’re building something.” This attitude came off as somewhat defiant, a confidence and
assertiveness backed by a nationally renowned reputation.
As Jasper Hill’s enterprise grows, particularly with the purchase of Andersonville
Farm, the source milk for Alpha Tolman and Bayley Hazen Blue, their relationship to the
local area that they consider their community changes as well. Though Andy and Mateo
Kehler are not from Vermont, only summering near Greensboro on Caspian Lake until
they eventually returned to start their business, Andersonville Farm and its former owner
Mark Rogers are a cornerstone of the area. This could change the reputation of Jasper
Hill among local residents, due to the long-standing roots of Andersonville and Rogers, a
5th generation Vermonter. As Don, one employee of Andersonville says, “[Andersonville
has] been here 200 years, it’s kind of the backbone of this part of the community,
everyone knows it here.” Thus, though the business model is relatively new, many of the
factors of production are deeply entrenched in local life and that changes the obligations
that Jasper Hill may feel in their everyday operations.
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Obligations to the “village life in Greenboro,” as Joe calls the local community,
must also be reconciled with obligations to actors along the supply chain of Alpha
Tolman and other Jasper Hill cheeses. Anna emphasizes the importance of responsibility
to the base product, milk, by saying that “we can’t make milk any better than it is, but we
can mess up perfectly good milk in turning it into cheese.” In Jasper Hill’s responsibility
to “realize the fullest potential of the milk” that they use to make their cheeses, they also
encounter a responsibility to the milk producer. All parties feel ownership over the final
product, evidenced by the sense of pride expressed by not only Joe and Anna, but also
Don of their Bayley Hazen Blue cheese, recently crowned the World’s Best
Unpasteurized Cheese at the World Cheese Awards in London.
Relationships between actors on the supply chain are characterized by
compromise, though the award-winning results serve as a positive result for all parties.
Don expresses pride that he was able to “relent [his] vision of the way a dairy should be
operated” in order to create the microbial environment that would please the Kehlers and
create the best milk for the cheeses. Changing his feed structure from silage to dry hay as
well as hiring more employees are examples of how Don’s policies have changed under
Jasper Hill ownership. This situation is unlike a typical cooperative situation in which a
milk producer would send milk to be pooled and sold to a cheesemaker or processor. In
that situation, the producer’s obligations toward the milk end at the vat - there is
generally not a reflexive process of change or improvement in the milk quality. With
Jasper Hill, actors forge strong relationships based on communication and mutually held
goals: economic success and an end product of world-renowned quality.
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Anna admits that “the most skeptical are probably the people that are the closest
around us, whose daily lives could be impacted by our approach to what we’re doing.”
That impact is not insignificant, with Jasper Hill employing over 50 people and
producing $10 million dollars a year in business. (Pollack, 2014) Joe also cited the fact
that 8 different employees purchased homes in the area of Greensboro in the past
summer. This could represent a significant influx of capital for a town of less than 1,000.
However, all community is subject to conflict, particularly when that much
money is involved in such a small space. Conflict is not the focus of this case study, but
rather the economic impact itself of a cheesemaking business on the rural community
surrounding it. The business model adopted by Jasper Hill and its potential rural
economic development impacts were inspired by the AOC Comté model, a connection
Jasper Hill has acknowledged since the beginning of their operations. In the next
subsection I will demonstrate how Jasper Hill has taken many kinds of inspiration from
and maintains a relationship with Comté cheese actors.

Comté’s Influence on Jasper Hill
Jasper Hill doesn’t just focus their business on their own operations. Part of the
motivation for building the Cellars was to facilitate somewhere for small cheesemakers to
age and market their cheeses, an opportunity that they hoped would “bring into being”
more local artisanal cheesemakers. (Behr, 2010) The addition of the Food Venture
Center, a food product incubator, in nearby Hardwick also incentivizes further cheese
production and development. Joe states that the Cellars and the Food Venture Center will
“de-risk the startup of a new farm by building the market before you have to go borrow
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all that money.” This regional grouping of farmers, cheesemaking plants, and a large
aging facility distinctly resembles the production model of Comté.
The linkage between Jasper Hill and Comté is not accidental: Joe goes to France
“at least once a year...to Comté every time.” He states that the “depth of technical
knowledge is inspiring,” and both Joe and Anna display extensive knowledge about the
structure and management of Comté, in particular their aging strategy.
Philippe Goux, the affineur for Fort Saint Antoine, the most prestigious aging
cave for Comté, is a personal friend of the Kehlers who visits Jasper Hill every year and
provides advice. Anna describes with reverence the process at Fort Saint Antoine, the “17
different labels...based on the personality of the cheese or...based from the age profile.”
She states that Goux is “operating at the very highest levels of cheese intellectual
capacity.” Joe, speaking from a more business-oriented mindset, admires Comté for “the
power of cheese over generations, the power of a product to sustain a landscape.” It
would seem that Jasper Hill also wants to sustain a landscape with their cheese and their
dairying enterprise.
An evident difference between Comté and Jasper Hill is that Comté is bound by
their AOC status to operate within a specific geographic framework, while Jasper Hill
would be free to choose to source their inputs from anywhere they pleased. However, in
order to fully express what they understand to be the terroir of their cheese and
consequently concentrate their economic impact, Jasper Hill is a highly localized
production system. The distance between Andersonville Farm, which produces the milk
used in Alpha Tolman, and the Cellars is a bit more than 10 miles. The farthest farm
producing milk used in Jasper Hill cheese is 86 miles away in Weybridge, Vermont,
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roughly a 2 hour drive. This is much larger than the 25 kilometer (16 mile) circumference
requirement for milk suppliers to Comté laitières. However, the overall zone of
production for Comté is 570,000 acres, or “two thirds the size of Rhode Island,” a
somewhat comparable size. (Comté USA, 2013)
The overall organizational structure of Jasper Hill is simplistically described by
Anna as “6 cheesemakers, 6 herds of cows, and 11 cheeses thereabouts.” Anna and Jasper
Hill often represent this structure both visually and orally as many straight lines radiating
from a (presumably production) center, much like the logo of the Cellars depicted on
their packaging and promotional materials. In describing all the supply chains of the
different cheeses produced by Jasper Hill, Anna used the phrase “that’s another straight
line radiating from the center.” This center/line rhetoric seems to be a method of
expressing transparency and accountability, as each batch of cheese is made with only
one batch of milk from one herd of cows, with no mixing. With no milk mixing, flaws in
milk or cheese quality are easily traceable and responsibility is shared among distinct
actors along the supply chain. This transparency may be part of the story sold to
consumers as part of a marketing strategy, but it is also a safeguard for milk producers
and cheesemakers to avoid creating a poor quality product that will reflect negatively on
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all parties involved.

Jasper Hill Logo. Source: http://methodikal.net/cellars-at-jasper-hill.html

More theoretically, the center/line metaphor is not only representative of the
actual Cellars but of the economic effects of the operation as well. Thinking of the
“center” as Jasper Hill, the lines might represent the income brought in by “harvesting
from cities” by selling cheese there. Only 10% of Jasper Hill cheese is sold in Vermont,
according to Anna, because they have chosen to compete on a national level by making a
higher quality, higher priced cheese than might be appropriate for many Vermont
consumers.
This strategy is a sort of inverse method of regarding “local food” as it is
commonly known, according to Anna. Rather than a transaction between a producer and
a consumer living in one region, the ideology behind which is commonly characterized
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by a desire to support a local economy or farming industry, Jasper Hill “harvests” money
from coastal urban markets and brings it back to Greensboro to spend on payroll and
inputs and investments. However, the rationale behind buying the product may still be the
same - as Anna states it, “[their cheese has] what people are looking for in the local food
movement which is connection to a people and a place, even if it’s not next door to where
they are.” Thus, motivations for buying local are exploited even without support from
traditional definitions of “local” that reside on proximity, and a “local” economy is
supported in the sense that Greensboro ostensibly will benefit from the purchase of a
Jasper Hill cheese. Anna refers to this process as an opportunity to “pull resources from
cities all over the country and world and deposit them in this area.” All of the lines,
coming from different urban areas across the U.S., bring money to the center where it is
concentrated. This model could also be used to represent the economic concentration of
Comté, in which all factors of production are rooted in the AOC zone and all the money
comes back to actors within the zone, though a large percentage (45%) of the cheese is
sold elsewhere. (Gerz & Dupont, 2006)

Jasper Hill’s Taste of Place
Though the economic situations may look similar from a macro standpoint, Jasper
Hill differs fundamentally from Comté in the ideologies that guide their “Taste of Place.”
This term, used on Jasper Hill’s signature blue label, also serves as a loose translation for
the word terroir, a term discussed earlier in this paper. Whereas terroir as it is used in
France might signify the expression of an innate geophysical characteristic of a landscape
by a producer, as expressed by Jacobson, 2010, the Kehlers derive their value from the
reputation of the cheesemaker itself. The product “is an extension of the ego of the
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producer,” according to Joe, and thus the reputation and the value lie in the
cheesemaker’s ability to produce the qualities of the product. Thus, Jasper Hill doesn’t
see itself as having “expressed” the terroir of their region, because according to Joe,
“terroir is revealed when there are two or more producers of the same product.” Unlike an
AOC cheese, in which many producers are all working on the same end goal using
proven and stringent methods, Jasper Hill has to rely on their own ability to innovate and
manipulate the microflora and conditions around them.
This tendency towards innovation isn’t seen as a burden, however: both Anna and
Joe expressed appreciation for their ability to express terroir creatively and not being
bound by traditions like an AOC or PDO cheese in Europe. As Joe puts it, “culturally,
every time I come back to Vermont I am so glad I am American.” This attitude seems to
represent a fundamental cultural dichotomy between the values surrounding American
and European quality cheese making practices - tradition versus innovation. Particularly
at Jasper Hill, interviewees expressed gratitude for not having to follow a set of rules like
a cahier des charges or the “baggage and constraints,” as Joe put it, associated with
operating within an AOC/PDO framework.
Jasper Hill seems to use a modern, Americanized definition of terroir that is
certainly aware of and attentive to the community, while retaining a pragmatism about
how to increase their profits. Paxson (2012) notably calls this viewpoint a “post-pastoral”
ethos, characterized by the use of technology within a working landscape to “work in
collaboration with organic agencies in a productive fashion.” When I asked how Don
interacted with terroir and how it influenced his operation, he replied, “I’ve taken from
more of a logical and pragmatic approach than an airy, lofty one because we have to deal
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in reality here...I’ve been concerned about quality milk, animal well-being and quality of
life for myself and those who work here.” However, both Anna and Joe provided more
elaborate, “lofty” definitions of terroir when I inquired, indicating that not all actors
along the chain are in agreement about what exactly “The Taste of Place” indicates. For
Don, who is providing the base product for Alpha Tolman, the important thing is quality
and economics: “‘The Taste of Place’ is their slogan and there are things on the bottom
side of that need to be done to make it all fit.”
However, the linkages between Greensboro’s particular microclimate and Alpha
Tolman’s characteristics are intentional and clear. The changes in feed structure and
inputs that Jasper Hill has required of Don and Andersonville through the process of their
relationship and acquisition has proved costly, a process Don sees as “going backwards
with technology.” However, all of these decisions have been made with the intention of
bringing out the microflora of the milking environment of Andersonville and increasing
the bacterial diversity and originality of the milk in order to express them as flavors in the
final cheese.
The concept of “going backwards” with technology in the interest of economic
profit runs contrary to the theory of the technology treadmill, a concept put forth by
Cochrane in 1958. Cochrane stated that farmers are on a constant treadmill requiring the
adoption of new technology that erodes any economic profit they gain. Jasper Hill, in
going backwards with technology (according to Don), would come out on the losing end
of the treadmill if they were participating in the traditional commodity milk market.
However, they create a different kind of profit through quality inputs and methods that
increase the value of the cheese rather than lowering the bottom line of production. This
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strategy is akin to the economic motivation for establishing a Geographical Indication,
and one more aspect of European influence demonstrated by Jasper Hill.
European motivations for Jasper Hill tend to be economically related, rather than
methods related. Anna pointed out that the years of toil on Alpine-style recipes by
European cheesemakers has allowed for Jasper Hill’s ability to perfect and improve on
the existing style. She finds that Jasper Hill can “mimic traditions” like the Appenzeller
recipe that inspired Alpha Tolman, but modify and personalize the product using modern
science to “achieve certain results.” Cheesemakers in mountainous French and Swiss
regions struggled for hundreds of years to create a cheese that would allow for the
survival of their families, and to Anna, Jasper Hill can “appreciate that while doing it in
Hardwick.”
“Doing it in Hardwick” may refer to the individualism and focus on innovation in
Jasper Hill’s cheese making. This is supported by relatively lax regulatory structures in
place in Vermont that permit the enterprise to operate according to their business needs.
Though Joe may be overly simplistic in asserting that in the United States, “you can buy
a piece of land a get some cows and start making cheese,” he has benefitted from
relationships that he sustains with Vermont policymakers and from a lack of regulation
on the part of the state. He states that “it would be impossible to build and operate a
business like this in New York,” based on the “very light regulation” that he experiences
as a cheesemaker in Vermont (Anna also independently cited New York State as being a
framework within which it would be impossible to operate). He cites bureaucracy as a
factor that would prevent his business from growing somewhere else, and it’s true that he
encounters fewer restrictions to accessing policymakers than another cheesemaker might.
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Anna tells the story of the FDA’s potential introduction of regulations preventing the use
of wood boards in cheese aging, a law which would prove disastrous for many
cheesemakers. She notes that “when the...issue came up, Joe went to Congressman Peter
Welch and like, by 4 PM they had a petition drafted.” This example of extremely
efficient and responsive government is part of the regulatory culture surrounding the
creation of Jasper Hill’s cheese that allows them to experiment and succeed within their
artisan sphere.
Thus it seems like the regulatory cultures surrounding Comté and Jasper Hill are
so opposite as to be polarized: the former is characterized by bureaucracy, order,
organization and government regulation while the latter is made possible by a national
political culture of minimal government interference in business and prides itself on
innovation and creativity. It would seem as if these two systems could not be reconciled
in any way, so deeply are their roots divided.
However, Jasper Hill does maintain an important connection to community, if not
via the traditional characteristics of terroir, and this connection could be amenable to an
origin-linked labeling structure if it were executed with the current individualistic system
in mind. One quote from Phillippe Goux, told to me by Anna, sums up the relationship
between U.S. and French cheesemakers: “We are not competitors. We are all in the same
boat, and the enemy is standardization.” In Section 5, I will explore what such a system
might resemble and how it could lead to the positive economic effects we have seen in
the Franche-Comté as a result of AOC status for Comté cheese.
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Section 5: Implications for Vermont Dairy Policy
The U.S. isn’t France, and certainly Jasper Hill isn’t Comté. Nor do they want to
be. The management of origin-linked cheeses in these countries have arisen from two
very particular regimes of intellectual property and agricultural policy, and they are
heavily dependent on larger cultural contexts that render them difficult to implement
elsewhere. Thus, it would seem that Geographical Indications may not translate to a U.S.
framework based on highly individualized and privatized intellectual property structures.
However, the U.S. does utilize a form of collective management that could hold potential
for origin labeling: the cooperative.

Cooperatives: Collective Management of Dairy
Dairy cooperatives have a long history in the United States, first recorded in the
1890’s but popularized in the 1920’s as a way to organize and empower farmers during
the price drops of the postwar agricultural depression. Bailey, 1997, recounts how
farmers felt disadvantaged “relative to the railroads, grain mills, and dairy processors,
who were few in number but large in size.” Cooperatives allowed farmers to balance the
forces and represent their needs against these large firms who controlled the dairy market.
Cooperative isn’t an easily defined word, but the American Cooperative Service
definition uses the phrase “a user-owned and controlled business from which benefits are
derived and distributed equitably on the basis of use.” (Rasmussen, 1991) The definition
for a dairy cooperative is legally important because of their exemption from certain
antitrust laws due to the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, which has provided agricultural
cooperatives the opportunity to legally collectively market their products under certain
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conditions. (Bailey, 1997) These conditions, described in Section 1 of Capper-Volstead,
are:
1. That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of the
amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein.
2. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital in
excess of 8 percent per year.
3. That the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount
greater in value than such as are handled by its own members.

The Capper-Volstead Act, referred to as the Magna Carta of cooperatives, arose
as a compromise between those who argued for more government intervention in the
agricultural economy in order to stem the farm depression and those who valued freemarket principles and fewer industry regulations. Support for cooperatives was seen as “a
more feasible alternative” to more government-intensive plans that involved parity
pricing (Bailey, 1997) In passing Capper-Volstead, Congress intended to correct
imbalances of power experienced by farmers in dealing with suppliers or dairies and
“give farmers the same advantages of collective action and benefits of size enjoyed by
investors in corporations.” (McMenamin & McNamara, 1980)
Cooperatives in the U.S. have also experienced many challenges, and a collective
structure can certainly result in unintended consequences such as negative economic
effects. One such example was the Dairymen’s League established in the 1930s. State
officials encouraged all farmers to join, and soon the system became too large, increasing
the need for manufacturing plants and driving down prices. This forced farmers to leave
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the cooperative in order to maintain their economic sustainability. (DuPuis, 2002)
Certainly, an optimal size exists for dairy cooperatives, like any other collective
marketing agreement.
Today, the USDA holds oversight power over all cooperatives in the United
States and is responsible for making sure that they do not “unduly enhance prices” using
monopolistic actions. (USDA, 2002) However, they are not restrained to a certain size or
a certain amount of market share, thus they enjoy benefits of collective marketing and
antitrust exemption. These benefits have an enormous economic value as well as market
power, particularly in regards to federal milk marketing orders (FMMO) mentioned
earlier in this section. A study by Cakir & Balagtas, 2012, found that cooperatives use
this market power to collectively bargain for milk prices almost 9% above marginal cost,
resulting in an income transfer of more than $600 million per year in markets regulated
by marketing orders.
Cooperatives also have enormous power to amend or create new marketing
orders, as they can bloc vote for all of their members. Because of all these benefits
accrued to cooperative members, the amount of milk supplied by cooperatives in the
United States has grown significantly: in 2002, 83% of all milk was supplied by
cooperatives. (Cakir & Balagtas, 2012)

Taken from: Cropp & Graf, 2001
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Updated statistics on cooperative participation in the Northeast and Vermont are
difficult to find. Most recent statistics, from 1992, show that the Northeast region holds
the fewest percentage of cooperative members of any other region in the nation: 60% in
1992. (Bailey, 1997) Of the 991 Vermont dairy farms cited in the 2013 Farm to Plate
Strategic Plan, approximate ⅓ are members of the Agri-Mark cooperative (operating
under the name of Cabot) and approximately 430 are members of Vermont’s largest
cooperative, the St. Alban’s Cooperative Creamery. (Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund,
2013)
These statistics mark an untapped potential for further cooperative participation
and collective marketing in the Northeast. Cooperatives hold potential economic benefit
for their members and a greater power in market negotiations, as well as an industry
support network that could be useful for participating members. (Bravo-Utera & Lee,
1988) They provide both empowerment and institutional confidence to producers within
a free-market commodity framework that normally reduces farmers to price takers due to
the fungibility of the product.
A dairy cooperative in the United States differs in several crucial ways from a
network of producers within a French AOC/PDO framework, though they both consist of
a group of actors along a supply chain with similar goals and interests dedicated to the
production of a good. AOC/PDO networks are obviously linked to a common delimited
area, with strict rules about where they must operate. This is not the case with American
dairy cooperatives, though they would clearly want to organize along regional lines for
ease of transportation and transactions. However, they are in no way limited in their
spatial existence.

61

AOC/PDO networks are also restricted by assurances of quality that rest on the
strength of their product’s cahier des charges. This notion of quality is paramount for the
economic rent achieved by the product, and is one reason actors have strong incentives to
follow the specifications of the AOC/PDO designation. Cooperative members do not
have these same specifications of quality that they must meet in order to continue their
association with other members or participation in the cooperative. However, they do
have to meet certain standards in order to guarantee that their milk receives Grade A
certification. For cooperative members, just like AOC/PDO producers, economic and
non-economic incentives exist for the creation of a quality product. (Bailey, 1997)
The services provided by cooperatives for their members, outlined by Bailey,
1997, can provide a framework of comparison for their similarities with AOC/PDO
producer networks:
1. Guarantee for their member producers a market.
2. Bargain for the best price terms possible.
3. Assemble and market milk as efficiently as possible.
4. Help achieve higher quality levels in milk coming to market.
Though AOC/PDO status does not technically “provide services” for those
members who are included in its designation, these 4 services are all functions of
receiving that status. AOC/PDO status allows producers access to a differentiated market
from similar products of lower quality, while still often benefiting from economies of
scale and opportunities for growth. (Réviron & Chappuis, 2011) AOC/PDO producers
enjoy a price premium over their generic competitors, though this premium can be
sometimes captured by intermediary markets instead of reaching the producer. (Réviron
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& Chappuis, 2011) They also certainly benefit from increasing efficiency in marketing,
particularly when a producer joins an existing AOC/PDO structure, as information
networks have already been established. Quality assurance in AOC/PDO systems has
been previously mentioned, but is definitely among the characteristics of the designation
as well as being a founding principle of the establishment of the system.

State of the State: Dairy Farming in Vermont
Agricultural industries in the U.S. benefit from government assistance in any
number of ways, from subsidies to legislation to insurance, all to varying degrees of
intensity depending on the industry and the role of the producers within it. Milk,
however, has had a continuous support from the government for a century, both in
management and in economic viability of the industry. Because of this, milk prices are
much more a product of federal policies and programs than they are a function of normal
market supply and demand. (Bailey, 1997)
Guaranteed prices for farmers may sound like a good deal for everyone involved,
but their effects on Vermont farmers in particular are extremely complicated and
sometimes run contrary to the actual goal of increasing farm income. This is for many
reasons. Dairy farms in Vermont run much smaller than dairy farms in large dairyproducing states like Wisconsin or California, producing only 1.3% of the nation’s milk
though it is the state’s primary industry. (Parsons, 2010) Average herd size in Vermont is
only 138 cows, compared with Midwestern or California dairying states that can milk
tens of thousands of cows at a time. (American Farmland Trust, 2012)
Only 5% of the milk produced in the state is consumed in Vermont, and thus the
rest is sent out to urban markets to compete with milk from all over the nation, which was
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often produced at lower marginal costs owing to economies of scale captured by the
larger farms in New York State or the Midwest. (Maroney, 2008) In order to keep up
with national trends towards agricultural concentration and efficiency, Vermont farmers
are pushed towards one of two paths: increased production in order to capture those same
economies in scale, though surplus of milk only puts negative pressure on prices which
then must be mitigated by marketing orders, or choose to add value and/or diversify.
Added value cheese production is a viable choice and one that we saw in Section 4 with
the Cellars at Jasper Hill.
Vermont has come to be known, at least within New England and the Eastern
Seaboard, as a hub of value-added agricultural products that fit within niche markets such
as “farmstead” or “artisanal.” These markets are characterized mainly by their status as
not industrial, rather than by any type of firm scale or production strategy. (Cope, 2014)
Artisanal is defined by the American Cheese Society as implying that “a cheese is
produced primarily by hand, in small batches, with particular attention paid to the
tradition of the cheesemaker’s art, and thus using as little mechanization as possible in
the production of the cheese. Artisan, or artisanal, cheeses may be made from all types of
milk and may include various flavorings.” (ACS, 2011)
Artisanal is not a legal definition by any means, however, and so remains open to
use by any number of producers of differing sizes and production strategies. Another
commonly used term in regards to smaller-batch cheese making is farmstead production,
defined as “cheese...made with milk from the farmer’s own herd, or flock, on the farm
where the animals are raised. Milk used in the production of farmstead cheeses may not
be obtained from any outside source.” (ACS, 2011) Farmstead cheese has potentially
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more definite economic implications than artisanal, as the milk and cheese both come
from the same producer and thus fewer supply chain actors and channels are utilized. In
this respect, farmstead cheese is the opposite of the commodity cheese produced in larger
dairy states - only one actor is involved, with no contracts and no price supports.
This association of Vermont with artisanal or farmstead production could be a
result of choices made by Vermont farmers to follow the path of specialization as
opposed to the path of commodification, though both kinds of production exist in the
state. Artisan, small batch, or farmstead cheeses are all products that result from this kind
of strategy, and they cater to a very different market than the commodity products that are
more easily produced in larger dairy states. Because of this, Vermont occupies a very
unique position within the dairy industry, with a comparatively small number of
producers contributing to a well-known reputation for quality (as opposed to quantity)
dairy products. Vermont has more cheesemakers per capita than any other state in the
nation, with room for further growth. (Sakovitz-Dale, 2006)
Though smaller-scale dairy production might be less affected by government
intervention, artisanal or farmstead dairy production chains are not immune to legal
regulation or interference. In particular, food safety remains a main concern of the U.S.
government, and recent legislation such as the Food Safety Modernization Act has
reinforced a safe food system as a priority for government agencies like the Food and
Drug Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture. Because of this,
certain precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of particularly raw-milk cheeses
on the market, both imported and domestic. The best-known regulation affecting
cheesemakers is the 60 day aging rule for all raw milk cheeses sold in the United States,
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due to concerns about potentially dangerous pathogens in unpasteurized milk. This law,
dating back to 1950, has been reevaluated several times by the FDA after disease
outbreaks linked to raw milk cheese aged for the requisite 60 days, but has not changed.
(Marler, 2013)
Federal regulations affecting cheesemaking tend to be focused on safety, a
universally politically supported topic, while state legislation has more bearing on pricing
and management of milk and dairy products. The Vermont legislature issued a one-time
payment to farmers in 2007 who were suffering from low prices and poor weather in the
previous growing season, stating that the government should support legislation that
“offers a reasonable rate of return for [farmers’] labor and capital investments. (VT
H.213, 2007) The Vermont Housing and Conservation Board (VHCB) is also involved in
farm prices, as they purchase development rights for agricultural land in order to help
both new and established farmers. VHCB also administers the Farm Viability Program,
which provides grants and technical assistance to farmers. This program focuses on
helping farmers diversify and/or value-add with products like cheese. (American
Farmstead Institute, 2012)
State legislature has also been very involved in dairy and cheese regulation
through the creation of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, an agreement among
Northeastern states to support dairy prices, and the Vermont Milk Commission. The
Commission was a board elected by the then-governor Jim Douglas in 2007 to assess the
current state of milk pricing in Vermont and create a report with suggestions for policies
to help support farmers without raising prices for consumers. (Maroney, 2008)
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The different kinds of supports coming from the state of Vermont to the dairy
industry form a sort of mixed bag of legislation without clear goals or objectives. Raising
prices for farmers while keeping prices low for consumers would seem to be an
impossible task and an empty promise on the part of the VMC. However, the institution
of the Farm Viability Program indicates a willingness to adopt new methods and adapt to
the specialized nature of Vermont dairy instead of continuing to pursue a productivist
model that might be more successful in other states. One potential method of supporting
Vermont dairy and cheesemaking is an origin-linked label like a Geographical Indication,
shown earlier to have enormous rural economic development potential. However,
implementing such a system isn’t easy.

Geographical Indications in Vermont
As shown in Section 3, the dominant status of trademarks in the United States has
caused conflict for international trade negotiations as well as for the status of American
cheese producers making ‘generic’ cheeses. Implementing a GI system in American
agricultural and intellectual property policy would involve enormous changes in the dairy
sector that just don’t seem feasible under the current political climate. Even Joe, maker of
an origin-linked cheese, admits that he’s “not sure a PDO system would really stick
here.”
If GI legislated cannot be created under current intellectual property laws, how
could state agricultural policy be improved to better confer those economic benefits to
Vermont origin-linked cheese and dairy producers? One part of the equation may be the
collective management structure allowed by cooperatives. Cooperatives have a long
history in the United States and are frequently used by dairy producers to collectively
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bargain for higher prices, manage their supply, and achieve higher quality levels. (Bailey,
1997) As these are all goals of adopting GI status for an origin-linked product, it stands
that there is reason behind implementing a GI-inspired, place-linked system that works
within existing Vermont cooperative structures.
Vermont policymakers and farmers alike have acknowledged the need for change
to the existing dairy management structure. In a state Attorney General’s Report from
2010, the authors admit that “the declining price of milk paid to Vermont farmers
suggests that the industry’s structure as a whole does not benefit farmers.” (London &
Zamos, 2010) One farmer, cited by the Farm to Plate Strategic Plan, states that “it has
gotten to the point where nobody...can pay their bills with the money they’re being paid
for their milk.” (Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund, 2013)
Value-added production and improved branding and marketing are often cited as
suggestions for dairy farmers to gain a higher price for their milk, but both of those
solutions require capital inputs that many farmers may not have. Initiatives like the Farm
Viability Program, which offers business planning and technical assistance to farmers and
food system business owners, helps but may not be sustainable over the long term. A
successful method of addressing dairy policy could utilise the factors outline by
Giovannucci et al. (2006) at the beginning of Section 1: strong organizational and
institutional structures, equitable participation, strong market partners and effective legal
protection.
A GI system linked to Vermont dairy cooperatives could embody all of these
characteristics, leading to a higher price commanded for Vermont farmers’ milk and
dairy products. This system could take many of the successful features of Comté -
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confiance organisationnelle, collective ownership, effective marketing - and use them to
confer economic benefits like the ones seen in the Franche-Comté and in the region
around Jasper Hill.
A typical cooperative structure pools the milk of all its members and sells it
collectively to an intermediate actor, who can then sell it as fluid milk or add value in the
form of any number of products. In this case, the intermediary is often capturing most of
the rent, and thus farmers do not really benefit from their milk being used in this way.
(Réviron & Chappuis, 2011) Therefore, a more successful method might look more like
the Kehlers’: a production line in which ownership of farm, production facility, and aging
facility (or other type of value-added production) are all concentrated among a set of
actors who reside within close proximity. All actors are involved throughout the steps of
the process, increasing confiance organisationnelle and incentivizing high quality
products.
Sales of Comté cheese labels to producers fund the majority of the Comité
Interprofessionnel de Gruyère de Comté, and a similar system could be effective for
Vermont origin-linked cooperatives as well. Farmers already pay a certain number of
cents per pound of milk, called check-off money, to fund the administration of the federal
milk marketing orders. (Bailey, 1997) If farmers were to participate in an origin-linked
cooperative that was not subject to the FMMO, they could use those cents to fund the
marketing and organizing efforts of the cooperative.
Vermont consumers are certainly not strangers to origin-linked products, leading
the nation in direct-to-consumer farm sales, farmers’ markets and CSA programs per
capita. (Agency of Agriculture, Food & Markets, n.d.) Creating an origin-linked labeling
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system similar to a GI seems more feasible here, in a state with such an evident
commitment to local food, than in another state with fewer direct sales and larger
industries. Wider markets could be receptive to such a system as well, as Anna pointed
out with her comment about consumers seeking food with “a connection to a people and
a place, even if it isn’t next door.” Success of programs like the Keep Local Farms logo
showed that consumers are willing to pay a premium for milk that supports farmers in
their area, but failed to actually utilise the logo on a product (it simply encouraged
consumers to pledge money online). (Vermont Sustainable Jobs Fund, 2013)
The implementation of an origin-linked cooperative system would require
extensive research and development through both governmental and institutional actors,
such as UVM Extension or the Vermont Institute for Artisan Cheese. Further research
into the current state of participation in Vermont or regional cooperatives would be
helpful, as well as current farmer satisfaction with cooperative structure. U.S.
government funding might be difficult to acquire, as their resistance towards GIs could
prevent them from supporting the project. Thus, research might require grants from
places like the EU or non-governmental actors.
The scope of this thesis was large, but rooted in a desire to contribute to Vermont
agriculture and dairy farming. Vermont dairy farmers and cheesemakers are a crucial part
of the state’s culture and economy and deserve to be able to compete on the national milk
market while remaining at a variety of scales. It is my hope that this project contributes
and perpetuates a conversation about the role of origin-linked products in Vermont and
U.S. agriculture, both as a method of rural development and a type of intellectual
property.
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Conclusion
This project provides a comparison between French and United States
constructions of Geographical Indications and origin-linked products. These
constructions are deeply rooted in the specific understanding of intellectual property that
these countries possess, particularly as they relate to agriculture. This has affected the
development of GIs in both France and the United States.
French usage of Geographical Indications was conceived originally as method of
protecting producers from fraud, resulting in the formation of the Appellation d’Origine
Controlée (AOC) system that serves as the foundation for other GI systems in the
European Union. (Barham, 2003) Today, the Institut National des Origines et de la
Qualité (INAO) manages the AOC label as well as several others used both on a French
and EU level. These labels allow increased consumer information regarding the
provenance of a good and provide a higher price point for producers based on perceived
higher quality of the product. (Bérard & Marchenay, 2008) This has potentially important
implications for rural economic development.
The first case study explored in this project is an example of positive rural
economic development impacts of an AOC for a group of producers. AOC Comté, made
in the Franche-Comté region of France, provides at least 7600 jobs in the area where it is
made. (Comté USA, 2013) Further, AOC Comté provides other non-economic benefits
such as increased rural retention of young people. (Gerz & DuPont, 2006) Compared
with a similar but generic cheese, Emmental, prices for fluid milk intended for Comté
production are consistently higher. (Colinet et al., 2006) As such, Comté is an important
economic and social driver in its rural region.
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Though the economic benefits of a Geographical Indication to a group of
producers can be great, conflicts exist on an international level when GIs collide with
differing systems of managing origin-linked products. The United States chooses to
protect its origin-linked products, as well as those of other countries, using a trademark
system. Trademarks and GIs are fundamentally different as intellectual property:
trademarks are a private mark issued to a single person, which can be bought or sold or
licensed. Geographical Indications follow more of a collective management structure, as
they are owned by the government on behalf of the producers and cannot be bought or
sold. In some ways, they resemble a public good: anyone who resides within the
delimited area and follows the cahier des charges can utilize the mark. (Josling, 2006)
As a result of these fundamental differences, conflicts arise between the U.S. and
the EU on a trade level. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS), signed in 1994 as part of the development of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), is an example. TRIPS requires all member countries to provide a
method of legislating GIs, but does not specify a method, so trademarks and GIs can
interact and cause international conflicts. (Rao & Guru, 2003)
Though these differences affect the overarching methods of legislating originlinked products in the United States, these products are still made successfully. One
example and the subject of the section case study of this work is the Cellars at Jasper Hill
in Greensboro, Vermont. Using a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews, I
explored the relationship between Jasper Hill and their community and the economic
impact of that relationship. Rather than being bound by AOC status to a particular region,
the owners of Jasper Hill willingly choose to operate within a small boundary. They feel
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obligations to the Northeast Kingdom community around them, and have an enormous
impact both economically and socially on that community. Though Jasper Hill has been
heavily inspired by the Comté model, they express appreciation for not being bound by
any standards or traditions other than those that they explicitly cultivate. This tendency
towards individualism and innovation, operating within a collective supply chain
framework (many producers, one Cellar), demonstrates their navigation between
American and French cheesemaking.
The implications for Vermont dairy and cheesemaking policy, as it relates to
Geographical Indications and origin-linked labeling, rely on existing collective
management structures. Creation of a Geographical Indication-style system in the United
States seems unlikely, given the deeply individualized and privatized understanding of
intellectual property used there. However, dairying and cheesemaking are often managed
by cooperatives and other forms of collective marketing. The Capper-Volstead Act of
1922 provided the legal basis for agricultural cooperatives and still today, at least 83% of
the fluid milk in the country is produced by cooperatives. (Cakir & Balagtas, 2012)
Thus, there exist collective structures that could be ultimately linked to origin and
managed to resemble a Geographical Indication in order to provide value to producers
and knowledge to consumers. The market exists for Vermont-made dairy products, or
potentially even dairy products made in specific regions of Vermont. The Milk Matters
Report survey showed that 85% of consumers polled were willing to pay a price premium
(no specified amount) for milk made in Vermont. (Vermont Dairy Promotion Council,
2014)
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Further research is necessary in order to determine the nature and amount of
participation in existing cooperatives and other collectives in Vermont dairying and
cheesemaking. Certainly the exact specifications for an origin-linked cooperative
resembling a Geographical Indication are unclear – what would the quality standards look
like? Who delimits the area and who determines the production methods, if they are
standardized? How much more, exactly, are consumers willing to pay for Vermont
origin-linked and terroir-driven cheese? Where are those consumers? Help will be needed
from both governmental and institutional research bodies in order to work towards these
answers.
This research project aims to participate in a current conversation about the future
of Geographical Indications, their relationship to intellectual property structures, and how
to best help Vermont cheesemakers and rural communities. Hopefully, it will provide
some insight to anyone interested in these subjects and further the cause of origin-linked
labeling in the United States and in Vermont. Many thanks go out to all who have helped
with this project.
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